Distancing Refugees by Heeren, Geoffrey
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/faculty_scholarship 




Today, two systems exist for addressing the humanitarian claims of
persons fleeing persecution. One system consists of refugees living in
host countries, often in large camps, who ideally are then resettled in
other countries or repatriated when it is safe to do so. The other system
involves refugees arriving in a country and seeking asylum-a right with
ancient religious roots. The first "encampment model" is fundamentally
broken, as most refugees are housed in the developing or least developed
world in terrible conditions for extended periods of time, with little or no
realistic hope of resettlement elsewhere or repatriation. The developed
world, which takes in only a tiny percentage of refugees worldwide, has
tacitly acquiesced to this humanitarian catastrophe occurring outside its
borders. Yet it has been forced in recent years to confront the worldwide
refugee crisis as the number of persons traveling to wealthy countries to
seek asylum has increased. Rather than respond with policies that ad-
dress the roots of refugee flows, many developed nations have pursued a
variety of strategies to interdict and otherwise distance asylum seekers.
Refugee distancing is a way to import the encampment model into
the asylum systems of the developed world. This blurring of the lines
between encampment and asylum is strikingly clear, for example, in the
tent cities that have cropped up along the U.S.-Mexico border under the
Trump Administration's "Migrant Protection Protocol" (MPP), which
requires asylum seekers to wait in Mexico while their claims are adjudi-
cated. The overreaching impact of such policies is to dismantle the nor-
mative force of asylum by creating physical, psychological, and legal
distance between the public and the asylum seekers who make a moral
claim on them.
This Article assesses refugee distancing policies-offering a history
and analysis of their causes, as well as a commentary on their future. It
contends that current policies may have unintended consequences, as did
the U.S. government's efforts to thwart asylum for Haitian and Central
American claimants in the 1980s-1990s. These efforts led to legal prece-
dent allowing for the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution and to a
political movement that created new immigration benefits for many asy-
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lum applicants. The Article sketches out the legal challenges to one
prominent refugee distancing policy, the MPP, and describes how a
transnational legal process might contest refugee distancing over the long
term.
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INTRODUCTION
Worldwide there are nearly thirty million people displaced by per-
secution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations.' This number
includes 25.9 million refugees, as well as 3.5 million persons who have
sought asylum in another country.2 Asylum is a right with ancient and
religious roots that is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and in many national constitutions.' Closely connected to the no-
tion of hospitality, asylum is at essence the ability to indefinitely reside
in a space and enjoy some set of basic rights while there.4 Not all coun-
tries offer asylum; the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the
Convention) acknowledges that it may pose a burden on many nations,
making international cooperation ecessary to deal with the worldwide
1. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED
DISPLACEMENT IN 2018, at 2 (2019) [hereinafter UNHCR GLOBAL TRENDS].
2. Id.
3. G.A. Res. 217 (III), art. 14, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); see
generally Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Asylum as a General Principle of International Law, 27 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 3, 7-8 (2015).
4. See id. at 9.
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problem of refugees.5 Therefore, the Convention does not require its sig-
natories to offer the permanent solution of asylum. Rather, the Conven-
tion prohibits refoulement, or returning a refugee back to a country of
persecution.6
Eighty-four percent of refugees live in countries in the developing
world, and a large number of refugees live in camps with very poor
housing conditions and serious risks to refugees' health and personal
safety.8 Even those refugees who do not live in camps predominately
reside in countries with high poverty rates, food insecurity, and a lack of
basic health care.9 Most refugees lack stable legal status in their host
country, and many cannot legally work. 0 Although the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) endeavors to resettle refu-
gees, less than 1% of refugees are resettled, meaning that many refugees
are encamped indefinitely.11 This bleak reality has precipitated an in-
crease in asylum seekers who undertake enormous risks to travel to de-
veloped countries in search of greater security.1
The long-term encampment of refugees in the developing world was
not envisioned by the drafters of the Convention, who had assumed full
integration of refugees into host countries would be the norm.13 Most
5. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees pmbl., July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
6. Id. art. 33.
7. UNHCR GLOBAL TRENDS, supra note 1, at 18.
8. BART DE BRUIuN, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH PAPER 2009/25: THE LIVING CONDITIONS AND WELL-BEING OF REFUGEES 11, 16-20
(2009); Karen Jacobsen, The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees in Developing
Countries 11-15 (Tufts Univ., Working Paper No. 45, 2001).
9. UNCHR GLOBAL TRENDS, supra note 1, at 17-18.
The Least Developed Countries, such as Bangladesh, Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Rwanda,
South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen, hosted 6.7 million refugees, 33 per
cent of the global total, while being home to 13 per cent of the world population and ac-
counting for a combined 1.25 per cent of the global gross domestic product. These na-
tions already face severe structural barriers to sustainable development, and usually have
the least resources to respond to the needs of people seeking refuge. Altogether, nine of
the top ten refugee-hosting countries were in developing regions (according to the United
Nations Statistics Division classification) and 84 per cent of refugees lived in these coun-
tries.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C. Hathaway, Non-
Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235, 242 (2015)
("Whether measured in raw numbers, refugees per capita, or refugees per dollar of GDP, the brutal
reality is that the overwhelming majority of today's refugees are in-and will remain in-many of
the world's poorest countries.") (footnotes omitted).
10. ASYLUM ACCESS AND THE REFUGEE WORK RIGHTS COAL., GLOBAL REFUGEE WORK
RIGHTS REPORT 5 (2014).
11. "There were 20.4 million refugees of concern to UNHCR around the world at the end of
2018, but less than one per cent of refugees are resettled each year." Resettlement, UNHCR,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/resettlement.html (last visited May 21, 2020) [hereinafter Resettle-
ment].
12. See UNHCR GLOBAL TRENDS, supra note 1, at 42 tbl.3 (documenting an increase from
1,079,700 asylum applications worldwide in 2013 to 2,145,600 in 2018).
13. See UNITED NATIONS ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL, AD HOC COMMITTEE ON STATELESSNESS
AND RELATED PROBLEMS, STATUS OF REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS - MEMORANDUM BY
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 2-3 (1950) ("[T]he refugees will lead an independent life in the countries
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developed countries do not seem eager to alter this encampment model,
which has disproportionately placed the burden of hosting refugees on
the developing world.14 Many developed countries have responded to the
uptick in asylum seekers with efforts to externalize their borders and
tighten their asylum systems.15 These efforts have taken a variety of
forms: interdicting refugees at sea; detaining asylum seekers; negotiating
with transit or sending countries to limit refugee flows or take back refu-
gees; remotely adjudicating cases; and imposing doctrinal barriers to
legal relief. 16
In the United States, the Trump Administration is zealously pursu-
ing all of these strategies.1 Among human rights advocates, its agenda
has been met with outrage and a sense that what the Administration is
doing is unprecedented and unprecedentedly cruel. However, a historical
survey of international migration control measures uggests that the Ad-
ministration's agenda is in line with an anti-asylum trend among many of
its peer nations.18 Since the 1980s at least, developed nations have pur-
sued policy designed to distance refugees-to warehouse them as much
which have given them shelter .... They will be integrated in the economic system of the countries
of asylum and will themselves provide for their own needs and for those of their families.").
14. See UNHCR GLOBAL TRENDS, supra note 1, at 17 fig.6 (highlighting that the only devel-
oped nation among the top ten refugee-hosting countries in 2017-2018 was Germany).
15. See EXTERNALIZING MIGRATION MANAGEMENT: EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND THE
SPREAD OF 'REMOTE CONTROL' PRACTICES 14-21 (Ruben Zaiotti ed., 2016); Lori A. Nessel, Exter-
nalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 625, 629-30 (2009).
16. Nessel, supra note 15, at 629-30, 638-41.
17. On March 20, 2020, the Trump Administration cited the Covid-19 pandemic as a pretext
to close the border entirely to asylum seekers. See Jack Herrera & Quito Tsui, Could Covid-19 Mean
the End of Asylum Law in the United States?, NATION (June 3, 2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/coronavirus-refugee-asylum-law/. Time will tell whether
this extraordinary step-in clear defiance of international law-will lapse or become a new norm. Id.
In addition, the Trump Administration has pursued a variety of other policies to doctrinally narrow
asylum and to limit its availability, in particular to Central American asylum seekers. See L-E-A-, 27
I. & N. Dec. 581, 582 (Att'y Gen 2019) (reversing prior precedent hat had recognized persecution
on account of family membership as a basis for asylum); M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 509-10 (Att'y
Gen. 2019) (overturning prior precedent allowing for bond for certain asylum seekers); Affording
Congress an Opportunity to Address Family Separation, Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg.
29,435 (June 20, 2018) [hereinafter Exec. Order 13841] (discussing the Administration's policy of
prosecuting asylum applicants who enter without inspection and separating them from their chil-
dren); Addressing Mass Migration Through the Southern Border of the United States, Proclamation
No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661 (Nov. 9, 2018) [hereinafter Proclamation 9822] (barring asylum
claims from individuals who enter the United States from Mexico between ports of entry); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208 (2019) (allowing for the removal of asylum seekers entering at the U.S.-Mexico border to the
countries with which the United States has entered into "Asylum Cooperative Agreements," or
putative Safe Third Country Agreements: Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador); id. § 208.13
(making asylum applicants at the southern border ineligible for asylum if they have transited through
at least one country outside of their country of origin and have not applied for protection in that
country); Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to L. Fran-
cis Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Kevin K. McAleenan, Comm'r, U.S.
Customs and Border Prot., & Ronald D. Vitiello, Deputy Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf't
(Jan. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Homeland Sec. Memo] (on file with author) (requiring most asylum
seekers entering at the Southern border of the United States to wait in Mexico while their cases are
adjudicated).
18. See infra Sections I.D-F.
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as possible in poor countries.19 Like lottery winners, a relatively small
number will be picked out of the masses each year for resettlement in the
developed world.20 The minimal resettlement of refugees allows the
world's richest countries to preserve a fagade of legitimacy around a
system that places the burden of refugee protections on the least well-
equipped nations.21
Recent procedural barriers to asylum, like the United States' "Mi-
grant Protection Protocol" (MPP), are the latest trend in distancing refu-
gees from the developed world. The MPP, which requires asylum appli-
cants to wait in Mexico while their cases are adjudicated by U.S. Immi-
gration Courts, is a way to import the encampment model into the asy-
lum system of the world's most well-resourced nation.22 Asylum appli-
cants who survive the dangerous journey through Mesoamerica must
wait in some of Mexico's poorest and most dangerous municipalities for
hearings in tent courts on the border, where judges on TV screens decide
their cases based on a doctrinally ever-narrowing asylum standard.2
The MPP's crafters likely hoped that federal courts would not take
the Refugee Convention seriously and would view applicants in the sys-
tem as being in a legal netherworld in which the Constitution only mar-
ginally applies.2 4 The abuses they experienced in Mexico would deter
future migration while being mostly outside public scrutiny.25 Their
claims would be efficiently denied by judges who would never have to
be in the same room with them, and applicants would never gain com-
munity ties in the United States that might make the public or adjudica-
tors sympathetic.2 6
This cynical vision is only one of the Trump Administration's many
innovations in distancing refugees.2 Whether by making applicants wait
in Mexico, removing refugees to purportedly safe third countries in the
violent Northern Triangle of Central America, or erecting new doctrinal
barriers, the overreaching impact of the Trump Administration's asylum
policy is to create physical, psychological, and legal distance between the
American public and the asylum seekers who make a moral claim on
them.28 Distancing refugees serves many purposes, but one of the most
19. See infra Sections LB-F.
20. See Resettlement, supra note 11.
21. Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 9, at 242.
22. See infra Section LF.
23. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Section IF.
25. See infra Section I.F.
26. See infra Section IF.
27. See sources cited supra note 17.
28. See sources cited supra note 17.
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disturbing is to elide the moral tradition of asylum-a duty stretching
back to biblical times.29
This Article focuses on the MPP, although much of its analysis ap-
plies to other forms of refugee distancing as well. The Article dissects
the possible rationales for the MPP and questions whether the program
will function as planned. The MPP might backfire, as did equally callous
measures the United States employed to deny Haitian and Central Amer-
ican asylum claims in the 1980s-1990s. Faced with the humanitarian
claims of persons fleeing some of the twentieth century's worst human
rights abuses in the Western Hemisphere, the United States pursued a
policy of maritime interdiction of Haitians and initially denied almost all
Central American asylum cases.30 Although challenges to interdiction
failed, successful collateral litigation forced the government to recognize
the due process rights of Haitians detained at Guantdnamo-a ruling that
paved the way for later challenges to the government's offshore program
of detention and torture during the War on Terror.31 Similarly, creative
lawyering and political mobilization forced the government to ultimately
offer asylum to many Central American claimants whose cases had ini-
tially been denied and to create new immigration benefits for them that
still exist today.32
The MPP will make it difficult for the latest generation of refugees
to gain a foothold for having their claims recognized. Yet, their access to
U.S. courts is a start. Advocates for asylum applicants in the MPP should
draw lessons from the asylum battles of the 1980s-1990s, in which inter-
national law played an important part in establishing norms, even if U.S.
courts did not always adhere to the standards of the international com-
munity. In particular, procedural challenges to Haitian interdiction en-
joyed success; claims challenging the procedural defects of the MPP
might prove similarly viable.33
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the history of
efforts to distance refugees, showing that remote adjudication pro-
grams-like the MPP-are part of a growing trend in developed nations
to treat asylum seekers like refugees in camps, and ultimately, to pre-
serve the status quo of refugees' long-term encampment in the least de-
veloped or developing world. Part II examines the causes and conse-
quences of refugee distancing as well as the normative arguments and
strategies used by advocates to combat it. Part III provides a series of
international and domestic law arguments against the MPP and posits
these claims as part of a long-term strategy to contest the program. The
29. Gil-Bazo, supra note 3, at 17-20.
30. See infra Sections LB-C.
31. See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 70, 203 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part III, for a discussion of procedural challenges to the MPP.
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Article concludes with a reflection on the importance of challenging pro-
grams that distance asylum seekers, while recognizing that the overarch-
ing human rights problem is the vast population of refugees stranded in
the developing world.
I. A HISTORY OF REFUGEE DISTANCING
Asylum has deep historical roots. Ancient Greeks and Romans
could seek asylum in temples.34 Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all have
lengthy traditions of respecting some version of the right to asylum.5
The Judeo-Christian and Islamic doctrines of asylum were developed in
coordination with extensive theological commitments to hospitality to-
ward strangers.3 6 As many monarchies became republics after the En-
lightenment, asylum began to shift from an ecclesiastical prerogative to a
secular right.3 Modern asylum laws have evolved to allow for refugees
to achieve full integration into the civic and economic life of some of the
world's wealthiest countries.
38
In comparison to asylum, the mass encampment of refugees in the
Third World is a new model, evolving in the twentieth century alongside
the phenomena of global conflict, international institutions, the develop-
ment of international law, and the militarization of border control.39 Alt-
hough the drafters of the refugee conventions did not envision the current
reality-refugees warehoused in poor countries-international law and
institutions validate it. a0 By taking great risks to travel to the developed
world, asylum seekers resist this status quo.
The response of developed countries has been to collapse the two
models of asylum and refugee encampment-to distance asylum seekers.
This Section outlines the history of this trend, locating it in the United
States' refugee crises concerning Central American and Haitian asylum
seekers in the 1980s and 1990s. The tactics the United States developed
during that time period spread and mutated in Australia and Europe, giv-
ing rise to new forms of refugee distancing abroad that in turn influenced
the development of the United States' response to a second Central
American refugee crisis in the 2010s.
34. Gil-Bazo, supra note 3, at 21-22.
35. Id. at 18-20.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 22-23.
38. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1159 (2018).
39. See Kelsey Kofford, An Examination of the Law, or Lack Thereof, in Refugee and Dis-
placement Camps, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 173, 177-81 (2012).
40. See infra Section L.A.
2020]
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A. The Development of Dichotomous Models for Asylum and Refugee
Encampment
In the early twentieth century, the League of Nations struggled with
how to address several large-scale Russian, Armenian, and other refugee
crises.41 At the time, there was a problem of states expelling refugees,
"who were very often pushed back and forth between two or more coun-
tries and punished each time for illegal entry."42 This led to the drafting
of Article 7 of the 1928 Arrangement relating to the Legal Status of Rus-
sian and Armenian Refugees and then to the 1933, 1938, and 1951 refu-
gee conventions, all of which prohibited refoulement of refugees.43
After World War II, the United States admitted "[d]isplaced persons
from refugee camps in Europe ... as part of a broader policy of assisting
in the political and social stabilization of U.S. Western allies."44 The
United States did not immediately sign on to the 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees (the Convention),45 but rather pursued an
idiosyncratic refugee policy over the following years. The country used
informal legal mechanisms (e.g., parole) to achieve its Cold War diplo-
matic priorities, admitting substantial numbers of refugees from com-
munist countries.
46
In 1967, the United States signed the Protocol Relating to Refugees,
which incorporated the Convention.4 Soon thereafter, the Vietnam War
precipitated a mass exodus of Southeast Asian refugees to neighboring
countries.48 The United States participated in a regional effort in coordi-
nation with Pacific nations to address the refugee crisis.49 Refugees were
housed in camps operated by the UNHCR on the condition that devel-
oped nations-the United States, Canada, and Australia-would take
them in. Between 1975 and 1980, about 300,000 Southeast Asians were
paroled into the United States.50
The resettlement of Southeast Asian refugees during this time peri-
od now represents an exceptional moment of true international coopera-
41. See Louise W. Holborn, The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem, 203 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 124, 126-29 (1939).
42. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISS'R ON REFUGEES, DIv. OF INT'L PROTECTION,
COMMENTARY ONTHE REFUGEE CONVENTION 1951: ARTICLES 2-11,13-37 art. 32 cmt. 1 (1997).
43. Id.
44. Deborah Anker, U.S. Immigration and Asylum Policy: A Brief Historical Perspective, 13
DEF. ALIEN 74, 77 (1990).
45. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 5.
46. Anker, supra note 44, at 78.
47. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
48. W. Courtland Robinson, The Comprehensive Plan of Actions for Indochinese Refugees,
1989-1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 319, 324 (2004).
49. Mary Crock, Shadow Plays, Shifting Sands and International Refugee Law: Convergences
in the Asia-Pacific, 63 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 247, 255 (2014).
50. Refugee Timeline, 1975: Indochinese Immigration and Refugee Act of 1975, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/featured-stories-
uscis-history-office-and-library/refugee-timeline (last updated Oct. 16, 2019).
[Vol. 97:4
DISTANCING REFUGEES
tion in refugee resettlement. Since then, only a tiny percentage of refu-
gees have been resettled.1 Moreover, in the early 1980s, the international
community shifted from an emphasis on local integration of refugees to
repatriation, despite the fact that the latter goal regularly proved difficult,
if not impossible.52 As large refugee populations built up in Africa in the
wake of the African independence movement of the 1960s and 1970s,
"[d]evelopment agencies such as the World Bank, UN Development
Programme (UNDP), and others collaborated in the segregation of the
refugee settlements to avoid the opposition of host governments.53 Dur-
ing the two International Conferences on Refugees in Africa (ICARA) in
the early 1980s, issues related to refugee integration took a back seat to
aid and development. Since the early 1980s, "the international communi-
ty has come to see long-term displacement and dependency in the third
world as acceptable and unremarkable.,54 Refugees languish for years in
austere camps such as the Kakuma camp in Kenya, a virtual city of
184,550 residents, where child "[m]alnutrition is rampant.., and over-
crowding has accelerated the spread of infectious diseases.
As the encampment model for refugee populations became en-
trenched, the United States finally created a legal mechanism for persons
who reached the United States to request asylum. In 1980, the United
States passed the Refugee Act. The Refugee Act amended the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA) to impose a non-refoulement obligation
mirroring the one set out in the Refugee Convention and to create a sepa-
rate application process for asylum.56 A stark dichotomy now exists be-
tween the two systems for adjudicating refugee claims-asylum and the
adjudication of the claims of refugees waiting abroad. While vast popula-
tions of refugees waited indefinitely in poor conditions in the developing
world, those who made it to the United States could theoretically obtain a
durable status with attendant benefits, work permission, and a pathway to
citizenship.
B. The First Central American Refugee Crisis
The commitment of the United States to new standards to formalize
the Refugee Act was immediately challenged by influxes of asylum
51. Resettlement, supra note 11.
52. See Merrill Smith, Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity, in
U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2004 - UNITED STATES 38,44 (2004).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 44-45.
55. Inside the World's 10 Largest Refugee Camps, UNHCR,
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=8ffl d1534e8c41 adb5c04ab435b7974b
(last visited May 21, 2020).
56. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987);
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425-26 (1984).
57. Benefits and Responsibilities of Asylees, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/benefits-and-responsibilities-asylees
(last updated Mar. 8,2018).
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seekers fleeing civil wars in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador, and
human rights abuses in Honduras, Haiti, and Cuba.8 Despite the new
legal framework for assessing asylum claims, the United States did not
address these claims in an evenhanded fashion.59 The United States
largely hewed to its pre-Refugee Act policy of using humanitarian immi-
gration in the service of Cold War priorities and generally dealt favora-
bly with migrants fleeing communist governments in Nicaragua and Cu-
ba, and negatively with the Haitian and other Central American claim-
ants.6 °
On the Mexican border, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) was inundated with Central American asylum applicants-about
two thousand per week by 1988 in South Texas alone.61 "[B]y early
spring 1989, [the] INS implemented a policy providing for initial asylum
decisions within one day of application, coupled with detention of all
unsuccessful applicants in South Texas.,62 The approval rates in the
1980s for Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applicants were consist-
ently around 1%-3%. In comparison, the approval rate for applications
from the USSR was 72.6%.64 In 1990, the Lautenberg Amendment to the
Refugee Act even codified a reduced evidentiary burden for refugee ap-
plications submitted by Jews and some Christian minorities from the
former Soviet Union.65
In stark contrast, the U.S. Department of Justice attempted to inter-
pret the Refugee Act in ways that facilitated the mass denial of claims by
Central Americans. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice initially
took the position "that the term 'well founded fear' requires a showing of
clear probability of persecution"66 -an onerous standard for refugees
who typically fled without documentation and had little more than their
own scars and stories to back up their claims.
Lawyers successfully argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in Im-
migration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca67 that this
standard-clear probability of persecution-was inconsistent with the
58. See Rebecca Hamlin, Ideology, International Law, and the INS: The Development of
American Asylum Politics 1948 Present, 47 POLITY 320, 327-30 (2015).
59. See id. at 328-30.
60. See id.; see also JEFFREY S. KAHN, ISLANDS OF SOVEREIGNTY: HAITIAN MIGRATION AND
THE BORDERS OF EMPIRE 6 (2019); Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating the History of
Central American Asylum Seekers, 36 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 569, 575 (2011); Maryellen Fullerton,
Cuban Exceptionalism: Migration and Asylum in Spain and the United States, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 527, 553-54 (2004).
61. David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (1990).
62. Id. at 1252.
63. Anker, supra note 44, at 81.
64. Id. at 80.
65. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND RESETTLEMENT POLICY 9 (2018).
66. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436 (1987).
67. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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UNHCR's interpretation of the Refugee Convention and Protocol.68 In its
analysis of the Refugee Act, the Court found persuasive international law
documents-like the UNHCR Handbook-and the views of international
law scholars; the Court noted the Refugee Act was passed in order to
bring the United States into conformance with its international law obli-
gations.69 Yet, after Cardoza-Fonseca, the government used various oth-
er doctrinal bases and strategies for denying almost all Central American
asylum claims:
[C]hallenging witnesses' credibility, requiring nonexistent or danger-
ous documentation (such as copies of death threats), delinking the
decision to emigrate from the experience of violence, treating indi-
vidual experiences as instances of generalized suffering, defining
violence as criminal rather than political in nature, and defining "in-
direct" threats, such as the assassination of neighbors or family
members, as not rising to the level of persecution.70
Central American asylum seekers and their allies and lawyers re-
sisted the United States' discriminatory treatment of asylum claims
through multiple class action lawsuits, lobbying for legislative relief, and
a solidarity movement.71 These efforts led to reforms in the U.S. asylum
system that improved fairness and efficiency (e.g., the creation of an
independent corps of asylum officers).7' A variety of temporary execu-
tive and legislative immigration benefits protected many claimants.
Class actions led to streamlined asylum processes for persons whose
applications had initially been wrongly denied. v
Thousands of Guatemalan and Salvadoran applicants eventually ob-
tained status in the United States, although the legacy of unequal treat-
ment in processing delays persisted. The less stable status occasioned
by the delays caused the children of many Central American asylum
seekers to be vulnerable to deportation for criminal offenses.76 Many of
the deportees were members of American street gangs like MS-13, mak-
ing the exportation of American gang violence to Central America one of
68. See id. at 441-50.
69. Id. at 436-37.
70. See Coutin, supra note 60, at 576-77.
71. Id. at 575.
72. Gregg A. Beyer, Affirmative Asylum Adjudication in the United States, 6 GEo. IMMIGR.
L.J. 253, 274-75 (1992).
73. See Andrew I. Schoenholtz, The Promise and Challenge of Humanitarian Protection in
the United States: Making Temporary Protected Status Work as a Safe Haven, 15 Nw. J. L. & Soc.
POL'Y 1, 4-8 (2019). The temporary immigration benefits included Extended Voluntary Departure
(EVD), Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), and Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Id.
74. Coutin, supra note 60, at 578 (discussing Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F.
Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).
75. See id. at 590-91.
76. Id. at 591.
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the principal consequences of the United States' discriminatory asylum
policy of the 1980s- 1990s.
77
C. Haitian Interdiction
The United States developed a policy of interdiction in the 1980s to
address Haitians fleeing the dictatorship of "Baby Doc" Duvalier. 8 The
government signed an agreement with Haiti allowing the U.S. Coast
Guard to stop boats carrying Haitians and forcibly return them to Haiti. 9
Although the agreement prohibited the United States from returning ref-
ugees "who [were] genuinely fleeing persecution in their homeland," the
vast majority of Haitians were returned to Haiti in the 1980s. From 1981
through September 1991, the Coast Guard interdicted and interviewed
approximately 24,600 Haitians aboard Coast Guard cutters; 28 Haitians
aboard the Coast Guard cutters were found to have credible asylum
claims and brought to the United States to seek asylum-the remainder
were returned to Haiti.8"
In 1991, a military coup overthrew Haiti's first democratically
elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, precipitating a human rights
crisis in which thousands of Haitians were detained, beaten, tortured, and
killed by the Haitian military.81 The United States reacted to the subse-
quent surge of Haitian refugees with an erratic and shifting policy as it
searched for alternatives to offering refugee protection.82 The U.S. policy
interdicted and screened asylum seekers; held asylum seekers on Coast
Guard cutters; sought to negotiate agreements with Belize, Honduras,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela to house refugees with credible
claims; and then began returning hundreds of Haitians to Haiti.83 In the
wake of a district court injunction blocking further returns, the United
States took interdicted Haitians to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantdnamo
Bay, Cuba-where agents interviewed interdicted Haitians to determine
77. Daniel Denvir, Deporting People Made Central America's Gangs. More Deportation
Won't Help, WASH. POST (July 20, 2017, 10:06 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/07/20/deporting-people-made-
central-americas-gangs-more-deportation-wont-help/.
78. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program, 18 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 677, 679 (2006); see generally Jean-Claude Duvalier Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 30, 2017,
11:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/world/jean-claude-duvalier-fast-facts/index.html
(providing background on the former Haitian President).
79. Claire P. Gutekunst, Interdiction of Haitian Migrants on the High Seas: A Legal and
Policy Analysis, 10 YALE J. INT'LL. 151, 164-65 (1984).
80. U.S. Processing of Haitian Asylum Seekers: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Legis.
and Nat'l Sec., Comm. on Gov't Operations, 102d Cong. 1 (1992) (statement of Harold J. Johnson,
Director, Foreign Economic Assistance Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division
of the General Accounting Office) [hereinafter Harold Johnson Statement].
81. Michael Ratner, How We Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp: The Intersection of Politics
and Litigation, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 187, 189 (1998).
82. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21349, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY




if they had a credible fear of persecution in Haiti.84 "During this period,.
• . approximately 10,490 Haitians were paroled into the United States"
after passing their interviews.
8 5
Along with screening Haitian asylum seekers for fear of persecu-
tion, the U.S. government also screened Haitian asylum seekers for HIV
and took the position that those who tested positive would remain at
Guantdnamo Bay for full asylum hearings, thereby establishing "the
world's first HIV detention camp."86 The U.S. government contended
that the Due Process Clause did not apply outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States, and therefore, the asylum applicants at Guant4-
namo Bay were not entitled to counsel.8
In May 1992, after the Eleventh Circuit lifted its injunction and the
U.S. Supreme Court declined review, President Bush terminated the
screening process, and all intercepted Haitians were returned to Haiti
with the offer of in-country refugee processing as part of a new pro-
gram.88 The refugees pursued a separate lawsuit challenging the returns
as being a refoulement of Haitians in violation of the Refugee Act and
the Refugee Convention and Protocol.89 The case worked its way to the
Second Circuit and all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. In Sale v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council,9" the Court held that the non-refoulement obliga-
tion set out in the Refugee Act and the Refugee Convention did not apply
to refugees interdicted at sea, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.91
However, the Haitian refugees' claims were not entirely unsuccess-
ful. The Court was soon criticized by the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights and the UNHCR for its Sale holding.92 Moreover, the
Haitian refugees' litigation efforts set important precedent concerning the
extraterritorial reach of the U.S. Constitution. In Haitian Centers Coun-
84. See Ratner, supra note 81, at 191.
85. WASEM, supra note 82, at 4.
86. Ratner, supra note 81, at 195.
87. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as
moot sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918, 918 (1993).
88. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 502 U.S. 1122, 1122 (1992); McNary, 969 F.2d at
1331; Ratner, supra note 81, at 191. The Haitian in-country refugee processing program received
applications on behalf of 106,000 individuals between 1992 and 1995. "Many satisfied the refugee
definition, but only the prominent - political prisoners, former government officials, targeted dissi-
dents, well-known religious leaders and human rights activists - were resettled in the US." SERGIO
CARRERA ET AL., OPEN Soc'y EUR. POL'Y INST., OFFSHORING ASYLUM AND MIGRATION IN
AUSTRALIA, SPAIN, TUNISIA AND THE US 36 (2018).
89. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 166 (1993).
90. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
91. Id. at 186-88.
92. Haitian Ctr. for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L./V/ll.95, doc. 7 rev. 156-57, 159, 163, 171 (1997); UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, ADVISORY OPINION ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF NON-REFOULEMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO
THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 24, 43 (2007).
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cil, Inc. v McNary,3 the refugees obtained an injunction granting the
detained HIV-positive Haitian refugees access to counsel.94 The Second
Circuit held that the United States' control over Guantdnamo Bay sug-
gested that the Due Process Clause applied to the Guantdnamo Bay de-
tention facility; 95 after a full trial, the district court held that the denial of
counsel violated the refugees' Due Process Clause and First Amendment
rights.96 The logic applied by the district court and the Second Circuit-
that the U.S. Constitution applied to the Guantdnamo Bay camp because
of the United States' exclusive jurisdiction and control over it-
foreshadowed and paved the way for the U.S. Supreme Court's similar
decisions during the War on Terror.
The United States resumed screening of Haitians on Coast Guard
ships in 1994 and transported Haitians with credible claims to Guant4-
namo Bay for full refugee hearings.98 The plan was for those who won
their hearings to be resettled in other countries in the region, but several
months later Haitian President Aristide returned to Haiti and the majority
of resettled Haitians residing in the United States and Haitians at Guan-
tdnamo Bay returned voluntarily to Haiti.99
In 1994, a wave of Cuban asylum seekers set out for Florida, and
U.S. Coast Guard cutters intercepted and delivered about 32,000 Cubans
to Guantdnamo Bay.100 The United States negotiated with Cuba to reduce
departures, opened a refugee processing center in Havana, and resettled
the Guantdnamo Bay Cubans in that were determined to have valid asy-
lum claims in other countries.01 Interdiction of Caribbean asylum seek-
ers remains U.S. policy today, although the number of interdicted per-
sons has paled in recent years as compared to the mid-1990s."2
D. Distancing Refugees in Australia and the European Union
Shortly after interdiction was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court,
other countries tried similar strategies.0 3 To varying degrees, a large
number of asylum-granting countries have engaged in some efforts to
distance asylum seekers."° These efforts range from the relatively benign
93. 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992).
94. See id. at 1334.
95. Id. at 1342-43.
96. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1040-43 (1993).
97. See Harold Hongju Koh & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council: Guantanamo and Refoulment, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 385, 420, 422
(Deena R. Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009).
98. CARRERA ET AL., supra note 88, at 36.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 38.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 36-37.
103. See Tara Magner, A Less than 'Pacific' Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia, 16 INT'L
J. REFUGEE L. 53, 54-55 (2004) (describing interdiction in Australia); Nessel, supra note 15, at 626
(describing interdiction in Europe).
104. Magner, supra note 103, at 54; Nessel, supra note 15, at 638, 643.
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practice of Canada dealing with influxes of asylum seekers by turning
them back to New York," 5 to Australia's draconian regime of interdic-
tion and offshore detention.
10 6
1. Australia
In August 2001, Australia refused permission to land the Norwegian
freighter MV Tampa, which was carrying 433 Afghan and Iraqi refugees
rescued at sea.10' That same year, Australia negotiated an agreement with
the Pacific island of Nauru and Manus Island in Papua New Guinea to
conduct offshore refugee determinations.0 8 The program initially lasted
until 2007, when most of the asylum seekers on the islands were resettled
in Australia at considerable cost, and the project was "condemned by the
then immigration minister, Chris Evans, as 'a cynical, costly and ulti-
mately unsuccessful exercise. "'109 Australia quietly continued offshore
refugee determinations at Christmas Island (instead of Nauru and Ma-
nus).
11°
In 2010, the Australian High Court complicated the offshore refu-
gee processing program when it held that offshore asylum applicants
could seek judicial review in Australian courts.1 Two years later, Aus-
tralia passed legislation limiting judicial review over refugee claims
made by offshore asylum applicants and creating a legislative basis for
the designation of a "regional processing country."112
After passing legislation that limited judicial review, Australia ne-
gotiated new agreements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea for offsite
detention of asylum seekers.1 The first cohort of about 950 refugees
transferred under these agreements never received refugee status deter-
minations and were instead sent to Australia; in Australia, the 950 refu-
gees faced extended waits before being allowed to submit asylum appli-
cations that were processed on an expedited track.114
105. See ABA Jmnigration and Nationality Comm., Int'l Law Section, The Canada-U.S.
Border: Balancing Trade, Security and Migrant Rights in the Post-9/l] Era, 19 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J.
199, 205 (2004); Sophie Feal, Issues Facing Refugee Claimants Traveling from the U.S. to Canada,
26 DEF. ALIEN 183, 185 (2003); Melinda Henneberger, Waiting, Waiting and Dreaming of Canada;
At a Shelter in Buffalo, Hundreds of Asylum Seekers Sit out Their Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
1993, at B1.
106. See Magner, supra note 103, at 56.
107. Id. at 53-54.
108. Id. at 56.
109. Ben Doherty, A Short History of Nauru, Australia's Dumping Ground for Refugees,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2016, 4:44 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/a-short-
history-of-nauru-australias-dumping-ground-for-refugees.
110. See Crock, supra note 49, at 263.
111. See Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth [2010] 272 ALR 14, 36 (Austl.).
112. Crock, supra note 49, at 265-66.
113. Doherty, supra note 109.
114. CARRERA ET AL., supra note 88, at 12.
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From 2013 to 2014, Australia sent a second cohort of asylum seek-
ers to Nauru and Manus. During this time, Australia took a hard-line
approach that his second cohort would be denied resettlement in Aus-
tralia; if applicants prevailed in their claims, the refugees would be reset-
tled in Nauru or Papua New Guinea. However, the applicants instead
languished for years in detention.1 15 Since 2014, Australia has interdicted
all new asylum seekers trying to reach Australia by boat and turned them
back at sea or returned them to their countries of origin.116 In 2015, the
United States agreed to accept 1,200 of the refugees.
117
2. The European Union (EU)
In 1993, Professor James Hathaway described the EU's evolving
immigration criteria as "devastating" for refugees.118 EU countries, in
isolation or in collaboration, have developed a series of mechanisms for
distancing refugees: (1) strict visa requirements; (2) interdiction; (3) de-
tention; and (4) agreements with transit or sending countries to take back
refugees or limit refugee movement.11 9 Notably, all EU member states
participate in the Dublin III Regulation, which requires asylum seekers to
apply for asylum in the first country of arrival and allows for the transfer
of persons who later apply for asylum in a different country.120
EU member states have adopted their own distancing policies. In
Britain, the government dealt with an increase in Roma asylum claims by
negotiating an agreement in 2001 with the Czech Republic allowing Brit-
ish immigration officers to deny persons leave to board flights bound for
Britain if they intended to claim asylum.121 Spain has pursued a policy of
interdiction and refugee distancing in collaboration with Mauritania-in
2006, the two countries established the Nouadhibou Centre, essentially a
detention center for migrants returned from Spain or detained in transit in
Mauritania. 122
In 2015, the number of refugees fleeing to Europe (from the Syrian
Civil War and other conflicts) spiked; more than one million migrants




118. James C. Hathaway, Harmonizing for Whom? The Devaluation of Refugee Protection in
the Era of European Economic Integration, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 719, 723 (1993).
119. See Nessel, supra note 15, at 654-62.
120. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, LEFT IN LIMBO: UNHCR STUDY ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DUBLIN III REGULATION 9 (2017).
121. See Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 AC (HL)
1 (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that the Convention did not apply to the Roma who had been
denied leave to travel to Britain because they were not outside their country of origin and immigra-
tion actions impermissibly discriminated against the Roma pplicants on the basis of race).
122. CARRERA ET AL., supra note 88, at 19-20.
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from Turkey to the Greek Isles.123 In response to the spike in refugees,
the EU and Turkey negotiated the "EU-Turkey Agreement" in March
2016. The EU-Turkey Agreement sets out an approach of financial sup-
port for Turkish immigration authorities and cooperation with resettle-
ment and readmission "by returning new arrivals in Greece to Turkey
and resettling, for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey, another Syrian
from Turkey to an EU member state.124
Pursuant to the EU-Turkey Agreement, asylum seekers arriving in
Greece have been excluded from relocation to EU member states and
subjected to a "fast-track" border procedure that focuses on whether ap-
plications may be dismissed on the ground that Turkey is a "safe third
country" in which they can seek asylum.125 Asylum applicants subject to
the fast-track border procedure are held in "Reception and Identification
Centres" on the Greek Islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros, and
Kos. 
126
Lesvos is home to the infamous Moria refugee camp, built for 3,000
refugees and now housing more than 13,000 refugees, including 1,000
unaccompanied minors.12' Although Greek procedures are supposed to
be "fast-track," refugees sometimes wait in Mona for more than a
year.128 The EU-Turkey Agreement and the EU and Greek asylum prac-
tices conjoin to distance refugees in an archipelago of tent cities on the
Aegean Sea.
E. The Second Central American Refugee Crisis
As Europe struggled to address an increase in Syrian asylum seek-
ers, the number of children and families fleeing gang violence in the
Northern Triangle of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala began to
also increase. 129 Asylum applications throughout the region rose rapidly,
and many asylum seekers came to the United States.130 In 2014, a total of
68,541 unaccompanied children were apprehended at the Southwest bor-
der-a 77% increase over the previous year.131 Further, 68,445 families
123. Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4,
2016), https://www.bbc.connews/world-europe-34131911.
124. Nanda Oudejans et al., Protecting the EU External Borders and the Prohibition of Re-
foulement, 19 MELB. J. INT'L L. 614, 632 (2018).
125. GREEK COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES, ASYLUM INFORMATION DATABASE, COUNTRY REPORT:
GREECE 13-14, 20 (2016).
126. Id. at 14.




129. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND
ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO 2 (2015).
130. See id.





were also apprehended in 2014 at the U.S.-Mexico border-about three
times the number apprehended the prior year.13 2 The number of appre-
hensions decreased in 2015 before continuing to climb again; by 2018
there were 107,212 apprehensions at the Mexico border.133 To describe
the increase of asylum seekers as a crisis-either one of border control or
humanitarian protection-has become common.134
This "crisis" is modest from a global and historical perspective. In
2018, there were 105,472 affirmative and 115,074 defensive asylum fil-
ings in the United States.135 In contrast, there were 664,480 asylum ap-
plications filed in the EU in 2018.136 While asylum filings in recent years
have reached historical highs for the United States, there have also been
large peaks in asylum applications during earlier periods; for example,
155,868 refugees filed asylum applications in 1996.137 The INS expedi-
tiously processed the applications, adjudicating almost all 155,868 appli-
cations in one year.
138
Thus, it is not impossible to imagine the United States adopting an
orderly system for efficiently and fairly adjudicating the increased num-
ber of asylum applications that have been filed in recent years. Instead,
the system has become overwhelmed with a growing backlog, and the
U.S. government has pursued a rapid-fire series of measures to deter or
distance refugees.139 The Obama Administration used a deterrent policy
of family detention and implemented a remote Central American Minors
refugee processing program for the children of U.S. residents.140 The
Trump Administration has cascaded through a series of more draconian
measures: separating families during processing;141 prosecuting asylum
applicants for illegal entry;142 narrowing the doctrinal basis for asylum;
14 3
132. Id.
133. U.S. BORDER PATROL, TOTAL FAMILY UNIT APPREHENSIONS BY MONTH: FY 2015-2018
(2019).
134. Rick Jervis et al., One Deadly Week Reveals Where the Immigration Crisis Begins and
Where It Ends, USA TODAY (Oct. 1, 2019, 1:21 PM), https://www.usatoday.conin-
depth/news/2019/09/23/immi1gration-crisis-migrants-us-mexico-border/2022670001/.
135. NADWA MOSSAAD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, REFUGEES AND ASYLEES:
2018 at 6 tbl.6a (2019) (noting in a footnote that it only represents principal filers and there are an
additional 55,089 dependents); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW ADJUDICATION STATISTICS: DEFENSIVE ASYLUM APPLICATIONS (2020).
136. EUROPEAN ASYLUM SUPPORT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF ASYLUM
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 2018 at 11 (2019) (noting that 9% of the filings were repeat applicants).
137. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1997 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 80 (1999).
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., Exec. Order 13841, supra note 17.
140. See CARRERA ET AL., supra note 88, at 41 (describing the Central American Minors
refugee program); PHILIP G. SCHRAG, BABY JAILS: THE FIGHT TO END THE INCARCERATION OF
REFUGEE CHILDREN IN AMERICA 117, 130 (2020) (describing the Obama Administration's detention
policies for unaccompanied immigrant minors).
141. Exec. Order 13841, supra note 17.
142. See id.
143. See, e.g., Proclamation 9822, supra note 17.
[Vol. 97:4
DISTANCING REFUGEES
banning applications from persons who entered without inspection;144
banning applications from persons who failed to seek asylum from an-
other country while in transit to the United States;14 5 negotiating "Asy-
lum Cooperative Agreements" with Central American countries;14 6 and
implementing the MPP for requiring applicants to wait in Mexico while
their cases are decided.
14
7
F. The Migrant Protection Protocol
By pushing asylum seekers back into a chaotic border region, the
MPP has considerably changed the shape of asylum adjudication in the
United States. Yet an examination of the program shows that it draws
from precedents like the adjudication of Haitian cases at Guantdnamo
Bay and the Australian and EU programs (described above) that grew up
in the wake of Haitian interdiction and offshore processing.148 This histo-
ry suggests that the MPP is in fact part of a broader trend and that forms
of refugee distancing like the MPP will potentially become the norm.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the MPP
in December 2018 and began implementation in January 2019.149 Before
the MPP, asylum applicants without valid visas were processed for "ex-
pedited removal" but would be detained or paroled into the United States
for an Immigration Court to hear the applicant's asylum case if they
passed a "credible fear screening."50 The MPP instead returns "certain
applicants for admission" to Mexico pending adjudication of their cases
by an immigration judge.151 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) offic-
ers have discretion to consider whether to apply expedited removal or the
MPP to any given noncitizen arriving at the border, and there is not much
information available about how they make this determination.15 2 The
144. See id.
145. See Homeland Sec. Memo, supra note 17.
146. See 8 C.F.R. § 208 (2019).
147. See Homeland Sec. Memo, supra note 17.
148. See supra Sections J.C-D.
149. See Homeland Sec. Memo, supra note 17.
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(D) (2018) (held unconstitutional in 2020 by United States v. Gon-
zalez-Fierro, 949 F.3d 512, 514 (10th Cir. 2020)); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(ii-iii), (b)(4)(ii) (2018)
(held invalid in 2019 by Flores v. Barr, 407 F. Supp. 3d 909, 912 (C.D. Cal. 2019)); id. § 208.30
(2018). Certain noncitizens who are inadmissible because of misrepresentation or who lack proper
entry documents are subject to "expedited removal," a fast-track process for removing persons
without them ever going before an immigration court. However, those arriving noncitizens who
express a fear of return to their country of origin receive a "credible fear" screening to determine
whether they have a colorable claim for asylum. If so, they are referred for an asylum hearing before
the mrnigration Court. See, e.g., DEBORAH ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 1
(2019).
151. Memorandum from Kevin K. McAleenan, Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., to
Todd C. Owen, Exec. Assistant Comm'r, Field Operations, & Carla L. Provost, Chief, U.S. Border
Patrol (Jan. 28, 2019) (on file with author).




limited guidance that exists states that CBP does not apply the program
to unaccompanied minors and Mexican nationals.
Once CBP decides to apply the MPP to a noncitizen, it issues a No-
tice to Appear (NTA) for a removal hearing and then returns the individ-
ual to Mexico.15' 3 Before doing so, CBP is supposed to notify MPP partic-
ipants of their specific court hearing date and time.154 If a noncitizen,
without prompting, expresses a fear of returning to Mexico, CBP states it
will refer the person to a USCIS asylum officer for screening to "assess
whether it is more likely than not that the alien will face persecution or
torture if returned to Mexico. '" 155 If asylum seekers pass the screening,
they cannot be returned to Mexico and can be detained or paroled into
the United States. 156
In Mexico, persons in the MPP are left to their own devices to find
food and shelter and fend off the criminal gangs that have opportunisti-
cally organized to prey on asylum seekers.157 The Mexican government
has stated that it will grant work permits to them.158 Lately, refugee
camps have started to crop up along the border, such as one in Matamo-
ros with makeshift schools, legal centers, and sanitation services.159 Ref-
ugees wait months in these camps for hearings that occur either in exist-
ing immigration courts near the border, like San Diego, or tent courts
constructed specially for the program.
161
A district court initially enjoined the MPP, finding that the plaintiffs
were likely to succeed on their claims that (1) the INA did not authorize
the MPP; (2) the MPP violated the Administrative Procedure Act; and
(3) DHS implemented its policy without sufficient regard to the govern-
ment's legal obligations to avoid refoulement.161 However, the Ninth
Circuit stayed the district court's injunction, largely focusing on and re-
jecting the district court's analysis of the statutory interpretation question
and allowing the program to go into effect. 162
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 1-2.
156. Id. at 2.
157. See Jonathan Blitzer, How the U.S. Asylum System Is Keeping Migrants at Risk in Mexico,
NEW YORKER (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-the-us-asylum-
system-is-keeping-migrants-at-risk-in-mexico?verso=true.
158. Scott McDonald, Mexico to Issue Temporary Work Permits for Migrants Seeking Asylum
in U.S., NEWSWEEK (June 26, 2019, 10:44 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/mexico-issue-
temporary-work-permits-migrants-seeking-asylum-us- 1446179.
159. Oliver Laughland, Inside Trump's Tent Immigration Courts that Turn Away Thousands of
Asylum Seekers, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/jan/16/us-immigration-tent-court-trump-mexico.
160. Blitzer, supra note 157; Laughland, supra note 159.
161. Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1123-30 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
162. See Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, 140 S. Ct. 1564 (2020) (staying the injunction pending
resolution of the petition for certiorari); Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073, 1095 (9th Cir.
2020) (affirming the District Court injunction); Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503,
508-09 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (staying the District Court's injunction). Much of the Innovation
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As of October 28, 2019, the United States employed the MPP along
the U.S.-Mexico border in six cities: San Ysidro, Calexico, El Paso, Ea-
gle Pass, Laredo, and Brownsville.163 On the Mexican side of the U.S.-
Mexico border from Brownsville and Laredo, Matamoros and Nuevo
Laredo are both in Tamaulipas, a Level 4 "Do Not Travel" zone (desig-
nated by the U.S. State Department) due to crime and kidnapping.
164
Tens of thousands of persons have been made to wait in dangerous zones
of Mexico that are wholly unequipped to offer housing and assistance to
a large population of refugees.1 65 As Part III outlines in greater detail,
MPP procedures raise significant Due Process Clause concerns.
1 66
II. THE FUTURE OF REFUGEE DISTANCING
In the wake of the monstrous violence of World War II and the
moral horror of Nazism, the international community agreed there is
value to a shared duty of sheltering refugees of global conflict.1 6' After
WWII, the United States accepted many refugees, but did so primarily in
service of its anti-communist Cold War agenda.1 68 Today's refugees are
more frequently fleeing from weak states unable to protect their citizens
from private violence, rather than strong totalitarian governments.169 De-
veloped nations are less eager to offer asylum to these applicants than
they were to Soviet bloc refugees."' Instead, they distance them, offering
Law Lab litigation focuses on a statutory interpretation argument about whether persons eligible for
expedited removal can be subjected to 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(C), the "foreign contiguous territory"
provision of the INA that purportedly authorizes the MPP. The government drew its authority for the
MPP from the statute that creates the expedited removal procedure. 8 U.S.C. 1225 (2018). A provi-
sion of that statute, section 1125(b)(2)(A), states that persons not put in expedited removal are re-
ferred for full removal proceedings before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229a. The
foreign contiguous territory provision, section 1225(b)(2)(C), permits applicants processed under
section 1225(b)(2)(A) to be returned to the contiguous territory from which they arrived for the
duration of removal proceedings. The statute also states that section 1225(b)(2)(A) shall not be
applied to persons in expedited removal. One reading of these statutes is that persons eligible for
expedited removal cannot be placed in removal proceedings, and therefore cannot be subject to the
foreign contiguous territory provision. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit motions panel held that
"Congress' creation of expedited removal did not impliedly preclude the use of § 1229a removal
proceedings for those who could otherwise have been placed in the more streamlined expedited
removal process." MeAleenan, 924 F.3d at 508.
163. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Expands MPP Operations to Eagle
Pass (Oct. 28, 2019) (on file with author).
164. Mexico Travel Advisory, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-
advisory.html.
165. See Julin Aguilar, Migrants, Advocates Mark the Anniversary of "Remain in Mexico"
with Fear, Anger and Trepidation, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 30, 2020, 12:00 AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/01/30/migrants-advocates-mark-anniversary-remain-mexico/
(more than 60,000 migrants have been sent back across the border through the MPP).
166. See Fatma E. Marouf, Extraterritorial Rights in Border Enforcement 7 (Texas A&M
University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 19-55, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3463718.
167. See Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 9, at 240-41.
168. See Anker, supra note 44, at 77.
169. Andrew I. Schoenholtz, The New Refugees and the Old Treaty: Persecutors and Persecut-
ed in the Twenty-First Century, 16 CI. J. INT'L L. 81, 93-94 (2015).
170. See id. at 86-88.
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refugees summary adjudications that take place on remote islands or in
violent borderlands. Doing so precludes many (if not most) asylum
claims while signaling solidarity to the anti-immigrant political interests
that have become increasingly powerful in developed countries.
At its ancient roots, asylum was an aspect of hospitality.171 But the
system of distancing refugees is so inhospitable that one wonders why
states even bother. If the goal is to choke off the flow of refugees, one
must wonder why these developed nations do not simply withdraw from
international law obligations entirely. 172 Perhaps, if countries only acted
according to realpolitik and economic self-interest (as some scholars
have contended), countries would withdraw from international agree-
ments.173 But asylum still exerts normative force-the concept of asylum
will not fade away easily because asylum is engrained in religious tradi-
tions, the modern regime of international human rights, and liberal de-
mocracies' sense of national identity.174 Every developed nation has out-
spoken constituencies in favor of asylum: faith groups, immigrant rights
advocates, internationalists, and sometimes even business interests.
175
These actors participate in-as Professor Harold Hongju Koh put it-a
"transnational legal process": governmental officials, courts, and interna-
tional institutions working to maintain the international norms of asylum
and nonrefoulement. 176
Yet distancing refugees is a way to dismantle the normative force of
asylum. When refugees are distant-in camps or tenements in the devel-
oping world-refugees are someone else's problem. But when refugees
leave the developing world and become asylum seekers, they present a
moral claim. Distancing refugees is a strategy to keep them at arm's
length long enough to blur that claim, so that it is not clear they are being
turned away. And when refugees' claims are denied, it might be a little
easier for decisionmakers to do so because the people, the refugees, are
distant.
Distancing refugees recalls the infamous Milgram Experiment,
where participants were asked by an authority figure to administer a
shock to another person as part of what they were told was a study con-
171. Gil-Bazo, supra note 3, at 18.
172. For several accounts of why nations largely follow international law, see Harold Hongju
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2646 (1997).
173. One branch of scholarship does argue that international rules are merely "instruments
whereby states seek to attain their interests in wealth, power, and the like" Id. at 2632.
174. For a discussion of the role of national identity in compliance with international law, see
id. at 2633-34.
175. See, e.g., Karin Sohler et al., Refugees and Asylum Seekers as Civic and Political Actors
in European Asylum Regimes: Comparative Case Studies in Austria, France, Czech Republic and at
EU Policy Level, 4 FINNISH J. ETHNICITY & MIGRATION 39, 43-44 (2009) (describing political
constituencies supporting asylum in several EU countries).
176. Hongju Koh, supra note 171, at 2633-34 (setting out a "transnational legal process"
explanation for compliance with international law).
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cerning the impact of the administered shocks on the learning process.
1
77
Participants in the Milgram Experiment believed the shock was real,
even though it was not, and a disturbing 65% of participants were initial-
ly willing to administer what would have been a lethal shock. 1 8 Milgram
later varied the distance between the participant and the person receiving
the shock and observed that physical proximity decreased compliance.
1
71
The drafters of the MPP likely counted on this psychological dynamic
when deciding not only to house people fleeing terrible trauma outside
the territorial boundaries of the United States, but to make those refugees
plead their case and tell their horror stories in tent courts to judges ap-
pearing by videoconference. Yet history shows that there are ways to
amplify the normative claims of distanced refugees and that distancing
refugees in a pluralist democracy can have unintended consequences.
A. Unintended Consequences
Deterrence is an often-cited rationale for distancing refugees.80
However, studies of refugee distancing are inconclusive on whether dis-
tancing refugees disincentivizes additional refugees from fleeing and
seeking asylum.81 When facing serious violence, people flee because
they have no other choice.182 Regardless of whether distancing refugees
deters future refugees from fleeing, the costs and practical consequences
of these policies undermines the utility of deterrent measures.
First, distancing refugees is not necessarily cheap as the proponents
of such systems likely believe. Distancing refugees often involves signif-
icant costs; Australia spent $1.1 billion Australian Dollars in 2016-2017
to support offshore processing of a fairly small number of asylum seek-
ers.83 In addition to logistical costs, distancing refugees requires negotia-
tions between rich and poor neighboring states; these negotiations can
create diplomatic issues. A case in point is the EU-Turkey Agreement,
177. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 2-4 (1974).
178. See id. at 33.
179. Id. at 34-36.
180. See, e.g., Joel Rose, Few Asylum-Seekers Winning Cases Under 'Remain in Mexico'
Program, NPR (Dec. 19, 2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/19/789780155/few-asylum-
seekers-winning-cases-under-remain-in-mexico-program (stating that the Trump Administration
argues that Remain in Mexico is a big reason the number of migrants arriving at the southern border
is down sharply over the past six months).
181. See CARRERA ET AL., supra note 88, at 10 ("No evidence has been found for the effec-
tiveness of the Australian model of extraterritorial asylum processing in the reduction of migration
flows deviating from the global trend.") (emphasis removed); Gutekunst, supra note 79, at 167
(stating that statistics concerning Haitian interdiction during the 1980s suggest that it did not have a
deterrent effect).
182. As the British-Somali poet Warsan Shire says, "[n]o one leaves home unless home is the
mouth of a shark." Marta Bausells & Maeve Shearlaw, Poets Speak out for Refugees: 'No One
Leaves Home, Unless Home Is the Mouth of a Shark', GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2015, 5:35 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/sep/16/poets-speak-out-for-refugees-.
183. See ELIBRITT KARLSEN, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, AUSTRALIA'S OFFSHORE
PROCESSING OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN NAURU AND PNG: A QUICK GUIDE TO STATISTICS AND
RESOURCES 3 (2016).
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which brought the EU into an expensive accord concerning refugee
rights with a regime with a dubious human rights record -and that re-
cently launched a military incursion into Syria that has generated even
more refugees.184
At the end of the day, there are a number of reasons why distancing
refugees is not cheaper than paroling refugees-especially since refugees
sometimes provide an economic benefit if they are able to work.18 5 First,
distancing regimes may be less administratively efficient than the domes-
tic asylum adjudication systems of countries, which have evolved and
been refined over time. For example, the MPP is less efficient than the
prior model of expedited removal, which screened out asylum seekers
who were deemed to not have a "credible fear" of persecution.18 6 Pursu-
ant to the MPP, all asylum seekers are funneled into the overburdened
Immigration Court system.18 v The government must assist in the trans-
portation of MPP asylum seekers to and from courts.188 Moreover, the
asylum officers are required to conduct screenings for the MPP in addi-
tion to conducting credible fear and asylum interviews, adding to the
administrative burden on that office.189
Because of the chaotic nature of border regions, distancing refugees
can lead to adjudication errors that can become embarrassing or expen-
sive. For example, in a 1992 review of Haitian interdiction, the U.S.
General Accounting Office found that at least 54 Haitians were repatriat-
ed who were determined (even under the ad hoc screening process used)
to have a credible fear of persecution in Haiti.1 90
The risk of error for the MPP is particularly high because the pro-
cess for assessing asylum seekers' fear of return to Mexico is defective.
Asylum seekers are only screened concerning whether they have a fear
of persecution in Mexico if they affirmatively raise that issue without
any prompting from DHS and without even being told that they will be
sent to Mexico.1 91 If they do so, they are assessed according to the stand-
ard of whether they are "more likely than not" to face persecution or
184. See Nicole Narea, Turkey's Invasion in Syria Is Creating Even More Refugees Just As
the US Shuts the Door, Vox (Oct. 11, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/10/11/20908160/turkey-invasion-syria-refugee-crisis-trump.
185. See Hippolyte d'Albis et al., Macroeconomic Evidence Suggests That Asylum Seekers Are
Not a "'Burden "for Western European Countries, 4 Sci. ADVANCES 1, 6 (2018).
186. See Brief for Local 1924 as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 25-27, Innovation
Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-15716) [hereinafter Local 1924
Brief].
187. Id.
188. MPP GUIDANCE, supra note 152, at 2.
189. Local 1924 Brief, supra note 186, at 26.
190. Harold Johnson Statement, supra note 80, at 2 (the report also noted that the data may
understate the problem, which could not be fully assessed ue to problematic records).




torture in Mexico.192 This is the standard that normally applies to with-
holding of removal (which is applied by an immigration judge at the end
of an evidentiary hearing with time to find counsel and to prepare).193 In
contrast, when there is no right to counsel and no right to appeal, the
MPP screening interviews take place within days.194
Applicants returned to the chaotic Mexican border region are often
homeless or in tent cities, meaning that they are unlikely to receive hear-
ing notices, leading to in absentia removal orders that could later be va-
cated.195 Without transportation to the port of entry, applicants must
"navigate through border areas controlled by deadly cartels seeking to
kidnap and extort them, in order to make it to a port of entry-often at
4:00 AM, only to wait in line for several hours, often with minor children
in tow, for court hearings that begin at 8:00 AM or later.-
19 6
Adjudication errors are significant because countries with a well-
developed rule of law will have courts willing to hear the claims of dis-
tanced refugees. In 2010, the Australian High Court held that offshore
asylum applicants could seek judicial review in Australian courts.19 Alt-
hough the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Haitian interdiction, lower federal
courts found the Due Process Clause applicable to Guantdnamo Bay-a
finding that likely paved the way for the Supreme Court's later willing-
ness to hear habeas petitions from War on Terror suspects held at Guan-
tdnamo Bay.198
Legal battles over refugee distancing can have far reaching conse-
quences-creating precedents that impact national security or other initi-
atives. For example, the United States could end up being liable for par-
ticularly egregious crimes and human rights abuses committed against
asylum seekers who were returned to Mexico despite raising strong ar-
guments that they would be harmed there.199 At a minimum, defending
the likely litigation over refugee distancing is a significant added cost.
192. Marouf, supra note 166, at 6-7.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 7.
195. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), invalidated by Garcia-Carias v. Holder, 697 F.3d 257 (5th
Cir. 2012) (allowing for a motion to reopen an in absentia order of removal if filed within 180 days
or at any time if the notice to appear for removal proceedings was not properly served or the nonciti-
zen was in state or federal custody).
196. Letter from Immigration, Human Rights, & Civil Rights Orgs. & Acads. to Cong. (Nov.
18, 2019) (citing Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Tent Courts Open as Latest Hurdle for Migrants Seeking
Asylum in the U.S., L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019, 7:08 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world-
nation/story/2019-09-16/secretive-tent-courts-latest-hurdle-for-asylum-seekers).
197. See Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth [2010] 272 ALR 14, 36 (Austl.).
198. See Hongju Koh & Wishnie, supra note 97, at 420-24.
199. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HUMAN RIGHTS FIASCO: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S
DANGEROUS ASYLUM RETURNS CONTINUE 1-2 (2019) (documenting at least 636 public reports of
rape, kidnapping, torture, and other violent attacks against asylum seekers and migrants returned to
Mexico under MPP). For a discussion of damages claims against the United States for wrongful
returns under the MPP, see infra Section III.B.
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In addition to the cost of future litigation, distanced refugees some-
times win their cases, belying the assumption at the heart of some dis-
tancing programs that the claims are frivolous. During the chaotic initial
period of Haitian interdiction, "approximately 10,490 Haitians ... were
paroled into the United States after a pre-screening interview at Guant4-
namo determined that they had a credible fear of persecution if returned
to Haiti."2 The majority of Australian asylum applicants initially
housed offshore were eventually resettled in Australia; although Austral-
ia stopped resettling the offshore applicants on the mainland, most off-
shore applicants continue to be found as deserving of protection, leaving
the country with an expensive burden of trying to convince other coun-
tries to accept them.20 1 It is possible that many MPP claimants will also
win their cases-although results will depend on the willingness of fed-
eral courts to countenance the United States' narrowing of asylum doc-
202trine.
History shows that systemic failures to comply with international
obligations lead to remedies that, over time, thwart a country's initial
expectation to not accept refugees.203 The first Central American refugee
crisis generated a solidarity movement and extensive political advocacy,
leading to the creation of various immigration benefits for denied Central
American and Haitian asylum seekers.2 °4 Moreover, litigation efforts on
behalf of Central American refugees led to the U.S. Supreme Court ac-
cepting norms of international law and the interpretive authority of the
UNHCR in its analysis of domestic asylum law.205
The legislative relief for Central American refugees of the 1980s-
1990s could not ultimately overcome the years of processing delays,
200. WASEM, supra note 82, at 4.
201. Of the 1,637 people detained in Nauru and Manus between 2001 and 2008, "70% were
resettled to Australia or other countries, including New Zealand and Sweden. Of those, around 61%
(705 people) were resettled in Australia." CARRERA ET AL., supra note 88, at 12. As of October 31,
2016, "of the 1,195 people who have had their claims for asylum assessed by the Nauruan Govern-
ment, 941 (79 per cent) [were] found to be refugees." Karlsen, supra note 183, at 10.
202. Since MPP has been in effect for less than a year, it is too soon to empirically assess
outcomes. NPR reported recently that 117 applicants had been granted protection out of 24,000 cases
that had been completed as of Nov. 19-a success rate of less than 1%. Rose, supra note 180. How-
ever, the statistics were not particularly meaningful:
Asylum cases that were granted relief in FY 2019 took on average over 1,000 days-or
about 3 years-to decide. MPP and non-MPP cases examined in this report have been
pending for a relatively short period of time. Accordingly, cases completed thus far tend
to be cases which take little time to resolve. These are likely to be those in which appli-
cants failed to attend their hearings, or where they lacked representation and thus were
limited in their ability to meaningfully argue their case.
TRAC IMMIGRATION, CONTRASTING EXPERIENCES: MPP vs. NON-MPP IMMIGRATION COURT
CASES (2019).
203. See Coutin, supra note 60, at 570-72.
204. Among the new benefits that came from Congress and the Executive Branch in the wake
of the mass denial of Central American claims in the 1980s and 1990s were TPS, DED, the Nicara-
guan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), and the Haitian Refugee Immigra-
tion Fairness Act (HRIFA). See id. at 581-83.
205. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436-40 (1987).
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which led to persistent inequalities and a more tenuous status for some
ethnic groups.20 6 One result of this more tenuous status was the deporta-
tion of thousands of Central American youth who had come to the coun-
try as children and absorbed the culture of American street gangs.20' The
exportation of thousands of American gang members destabilized coun-
tries already teetering from decades of civil war, prompting, in part, the
second Central American refugee crisis.20' This experience shows that a
callous response to a refugee crisis can have far-reaching, negative con-
sequences.
B. Crossing Distance
One impact of distancing refugees is less public visibility into the
issue. Media attention, human rights activism, litigation, scholarship,
literature, and artwork offer methods to combat this dynamic. Considera-
ble attention, for example, has been paid to the poignant art of Iraqi plas-
terer turned artist, Abbas Al Aboudi, who has been detained for years on
Nauru.209 In 2018, a group of thirty-three artists illustrated the "Nauru
Files," Guardian Australia's 2016 release of 2,000 leaked reports from
Australia's immigration detention system concerning violence, self-
harm, sexual assault, and mental illness.
210
Distancing also limits refugees' legal claims. Australia has sought
to legislate away offshore asylum applicants' right to access domestic
courts .2 1 The U.S. government may rely on the plenary power doctrine
to argue that it deserves significant deference to implement the MPP in a
way that offers minimal due process.21 2 For over a century, federal courts
have adopted an "entry fiction" whereby some immigrants are deemed
outside the United States for legal purposes even when they are physical-
ly present for years, litigating their claims.21 3 In the case of the MPP, the
entry fiction is less fictional; the government has physically removed the
asylum seekers, who just barely cross the border only on occasions when
they have hearings.
During Haitian interdiction, the U.S. government argued (as it did
during the War on Terror) that Guantdnamo Bay is outside the jurisdic-
tion of the U.S. Constitution. Because the U.S. government's position
was rejected, it would be difficult for the U.S. government to contend
206. See Coutin, supra note 60, at 585-86.
207. Denvir, supra note 77.
208. See id.
209. Ben Winsor, 'I Paint to Forget": A Refugee Turns to Art on Nauru, SBS NEWS (Jan. 3,
2018), https://www.sbs.com.au/news/i-paint-to-forget-a-refugee-turns-to-art-on-nauru.
210. Naaman Zhou, Illustrating the Nauru Files. "'We Have to Fight with Something",
GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2018, 4:40 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2018/feb/O3/illustrating-the-nauru-files-we-have-to-fight-with-something.
211. See Crock, supra note 49, at 266.
212. See Marouf, supra note 166, at 18, 35.
213. See id. at 19.
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that the MPP participants cannot claim the protection of the Due Process
Clause. After all, proceedings take place pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which mandates certain procedural rights, such as the
ability to present evidence and examine the government's evidence.214
However, the U.S. government may rely on its plenary power to claim
deference for its narrow interpretation of those rights in the MPP context.
The Haitian interdiction by the U.S. government provides insight on
how to amplify the MPP refugees' claims. The likelihood of success at
the U.S. Supreme Court on the non-refoulement argument in Sale was
always in doubt.25 Yet, the Haitian refugees' lawyers secured victories
in the litigation: bringing thousands of refugees to the United States, vin-
dicating a right to due process for them, and closing the HIV detention
camp on Guantdnamo Bay.216 The refugees' lawyers achieved these suc-
cesses through a strategy of provoking "the articulation of norms by
sympathetic judicial fora," which they then used for political bargain-
ing.21 The refugee attorneys sought o marshal the media, sympathetic
constituencies and political figures, and international institutions and
actors such as the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights and
exiled Haitian President Aristide, who condemned the interdiction poli-
cy.21 8 A similar transnational legal strategy-focusing on lower federal
courts, the Inter-American Commission, and lobbying of American and
Mexican governmental officials-might limit the impact of the MPP.
III. CHALLENGING THE MPP
History teaches that even when it is an uphill battle, litigation can be
an effective component of a broader advocacy strategy contesting refu-
gee distancing. Litigation challenges to the MPP are already underway
but in early stages.21 9 Without pretending to be comprehensive, this Sec-
tion sketches out some of the relevant issues concerning MPP litigation.
A. International Law
There are strong arguments that the MPP violates international
law. 2 First, it systematically subjects asylum seekers to refoulement in
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2018).
215. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 159 (1993).
216. Ratner, supra note 81, at 187.
217. Hongju Koh & Wishnie, supra note 97, at 414.
218. See id. at 414-15.
219. See, e.g., Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 508 (9th Cir. 2019) (per
curiam); Doe v. Wolf, No. 19-CV-2119-DMS, 2020 WL 209100, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2020).
220. See Brief for Amnesty Int'l USA et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs -Appellees,
Innovation Law Lab, 924 F.3d 503 (No. 19-15716) [hereinafter Brief for Amnesty]; Brief for Human
Rights First as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, Innovation Law Lab v. Nielson, 366
F. Supp. 3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-15716) [hereinafter Human Rights First Brief]; Brief for
United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Innovation Law Lab, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (No. 19-15716) [hereinafter Brief for UNHCR]; Local
1924 Brief, supra note 185.
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violation of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention by returning them to
Mexico where they may be at risk of persecution by the same transna-
tional criminal actors they fled.221 It also subjects asylum seekers to re-
foulement by creating substantial logistical barriers to their attendance at
their final asylum hearings. Next, conditions in Mexico are so hazardous
that they violate guarantees in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) to life, "liberty and security of person[,] ...
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person[,]" and to freedom
from "torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.
222
Past challenges to refugee distancing like Sale223 and Regina v. Im-
migration Officer at Prague Airport224 failed on the question of jurisdic-
tion. In contrast to those challenges, asylum seekers on U.S. territory are
unquestionably subject to the jurisdiction of American courts to the ex-
tent that they receive screenings and hearings where U.S. law applies.225
American courts clearly have jurisdiction, as a general matter, to address
the adequacy of the process that the United States conducts to determine
whether or not to place persons in the MPP and to ultimately decide their
claims.
The screenings to determine whether to subject asylum seekers to
the MPP fail to comply with the requirements of the Refugee Conven-
tion. Under the Convention, the primary responsibility to offer protection
to asylum seekers rests with the country where asylum is sought.226
Transfer arrangements, according to the UNHCR, must be secured
through a binding agreement securing the rights guaranteed under the
Convention and enforceable by asylum seekers in a court.227 Most im-
portantly, any process for referring refugees to another country for pro-
cessing must assure that they will not be subjected to persecution in the
221. Brief for Aniesty, supra note 222; Human Rights Brief, supra note 222; Brief for
UNHCR, supra note 222; Local 1924 Brief, supra note 185.
222. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Part III, art. 6, 1, art. 7, 1, art. 9,
1, art. 10, 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into by the United States on Sept. 8, 1992)
[hereinafter International Covenant]; see id. art. 17, art. 23, 1, art. 24, 1 (family separation vio-
lates the ICCPR); see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into by the United States on
Nov. 20, 1994); Letter from Women's Refugee Comm'n to Cameron Quinn, Office of Civil Rights
& Civil Liberties, Dep't of Homeland Sec., and Joseph Cuffari, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Homeland
Sec. (Aug. 16, 2019) (on file with author) (the MPP also leads to family separation by sometimes
paroling some family members while returning others to Mexico).
223. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 159 (1993).
224. Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55, 11-12, 16, 32 [2005] 2
AC (HL) 1 (appeal taken from Eng.).
225. The MPP hearings occur pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(C), 1229a (2018). See Inno-
vation Law Lab, 924 F.3d at 507-08.
226. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, GUIDANCE NOTE ON BILATERAL
AND/OR MULTILATERAL TRANSFER ARRANGEMENTS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (2013) [hereinafter
UNHCR GUIDANCE NOTE].
227. GuY GOODWIN-GILL & JANE McADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 252-53
(3d ed. 2007); UNHCR GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 226, at 1.
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receiving state and must contain procedural safeguards such as the right
to counsel and a means of appeal.228
The MPP process is defective in this regard: asylum seekers are on-
ly screened concerning whether they have a fear of persecution in Mexi-
co if they affirmatively raise that issue without any prompting from DHS
and without even being told that they will be sent to Mexico.229 Although
the UNHCR states that asylum seekers share the burden of proof with the
state in which they seek asylum,230 the MPP requires asylum seekers to
meet the onerous burden of showing that they are "'more likely than not'
to face persecution or torture in Mexico."2"' Moreover, the entire process
takes place within days, with little practical possibility of obtaining legal
counsel.232
The conditions that asylum applicants face in Mexico violate inter-
national law. The region in Mexico along the U.S. border does not offer a
safe environment for asylum seekers, who are regularly assaulted and
extorted there and who could be at risk from the same transnational ac-
tors they fled. 3 Cities in Northern Mexico long ago ran out of shelter
space for migrants, resulting in thousands of asylum seekers living in
encampments on the street without regular access to food, potable water,
or sanitation facilities.234 These hazardous conditions violate guarantees
in the ICCPR to life, "liberty and security of person[,] ... respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person," and to freedom from "torture or..
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."'235
The United States is liable for these conditions under the prevailing
tests for analyzing international human rights claims.236 First, the United
228. See UNHCR GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 226, at 1-2; UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R
FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: ASYLUM PROCESSES
(FAIR AND EFFICIENT ASYLUM PROCEDURES) 11-13 (2001) [hereinafter UNHCR GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS].
229. Innovation Law Lab, 924 F.3d at 511.
230. UNHCR GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS, supra note 228, at 13.
231. Marouf, supra note 166, at 6.
232. Id. at 7.
233. See Human Rights First Brief, supra note 220, at 28-31.
234. See "We Can't Help You Here.": US Returns of Asylum Seekers to Mexico, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (July 2, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/07/02/we-cant-help-you-here/us-
returns-asylum-seekers-mexico.
235. International Covenant, supra note 222, at pt. III, art. 6, 1, art. 7, 1, art. 9, 1, art. 10,
1. In the analogous context of transfers pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation, European courts have
held that transfers violate Article 4 of the European Charter where an EU member state is aware of
reception conditions of asylum seekers in the other state that could create a risk of being subjected to
"inhuman or degrading treatment." Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S., M.E., et al. v. Sec'y of
State for the Home Dep't and Refugee Applications Comm'r, Minister for Justice, Equal. & Law
Reform, 2011 (Algeria Ireland).
236. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., GENERAL COMMENT No. 31 [80]: THE
NATURE OF THE GENERAL LEGAL OBLIGATION IMPOSED ON STATES PARTIES TO THE COVENANT 4
(2004).
States ... are required by [the Civil and Political Covenant] to respect and to ensure the
Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject
to their jurisdiction. This means that a State .. . must respect and ensure the rights laid
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States exercises ignificant control over MPP transferees when it returns
them to Mexico and requires them to remain in the chaotic border region
while awaiting adjudication of their asylum claims. A state is clearly
accountable under international law when it "initially takes custody and
control of refugees and asylum seekers, whether they are found outside
territory, such as on the high seas, or on state territory, after arrival." '23
Moreover, the United States is the architect of the MPP and encouraged
Mexico to participate in it, leading to the development of de facto refu-
gee camps along the border and all the resulting problems of deprivation
and criminal exploitation. The European Court of Human Rights has
found that the exercise of public powers abroad is also a basis for juris-
diction over extraterritorial breaches of international law.238 By con-
scripting Mexico into housing a large refugee population along the bor-
der, the United States has effectively exercised public powers abroad.
Since the United States has exercised public powers in Mexico and con-
trol over the MPP transferees, there should be jurisdiction under the pre-
vailing tests for claims involving extraterritorial human rights claims.
The underlying merits hearings for the MPP are also fundamentally
defective in at least one regard. Leaving aside interpretation issues, or
that the hearings often occur in tent courts presided over by judges ap-
pearing via video, there is a larger problem. Once returned to Mexico,
applicants are typically homeless or in tent cities, and their poor and itin-
erant status puts them at a fundamental disadvantage when it comes to
accessing counsel, gathering evidence, or even just receiving their hear-
ing notices. As a result, 32,318 of the 65,105 MPP cases to date have
resulted in in absentia orders.239 Typically, an in absentia order is an
order of removal, and in fact, 27,846 of the 32,318 removal orders were
in absentia orders.240 The fact that over 40% of asylum seekers in the
MPP are being ordered removed in absentia reveals that the system does
not offer a process reasonably designed to prevent refoulement as re-
quired by Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.
down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State...
even if not situated within the territory of the State ....
Id.; Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 9, at 266; Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Extraterritorial
Processing of Claims to Asylum or Protection: The Legal Responsibilities of States and Internation-
al Organisations, 9 U. TECH. SYDNEY L. REV. 26, 38 (2007); Oudejans et al., supra note 124, at 627.
237. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 236, at 38.
238. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589, 46, 57-63
(2011) ("[T]he Court has recognised the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a Contracting
State when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, it
exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government .... ").
239. TRAC IMMIGRATION, DETAILS ON MPP (REMAIN IN MEXICO) DEPORTATION
PROCEEDINGS BY HEARING LOCATION AND ATTENDANCE, REPRESENTATION, NATIONALITY,
MONTH AND YEAR OF NTA, OUTCOME, AND CURRENT STATUS (2020) [hereinafter TRAC




B. Domestic Legal Challenges
There are a host of possible challenges to the MPP under United
States law. Some of these pertain to the legality of the program and could
result in a declaratory judgment that it is unlawful or an injunction
against it; others could take the form of damages claims for harms to
asylum seekers in Mexico.
With respect to the first category, there initially is the complex
question of statutory interpretation concerning whether the MPP is au-
thorized by the INA.241 Separate from the question of statutory interpre-
tation are questions of administrative law concerning whether the sudden
and scattershot implementation of the program complies with norms for
agency action; if not, it may violate the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).242 Next, there is a question under domestic law of whether the
MPP violates the prohibition on refoulement, since that standard is codi-
fied in the INA as well as the Refugee Convention.243 Last, there is the
question of whether the program violates the Due Process Clause be-
cause the legal screenings and ultimate hearings create a very high possi-
bility for erroneous transfers to life threatening conditions in Mexico.
24
The Due Process argument will have to contend with the deferential
treatment courts give to the Executive Branch with respect to the admis-
sion of noncitizens under the "plenary power" doctrine.245 The Court has
also often applied an "entry fiction" under which noncitizens seeking
admission are considered outside the United States for constitutional
purposes.24 6 This entry fiction could be at issue for due process challeng-
es to the MPP, particularly those pertaining to the screening stage at
which noncitizens are caught at the threshold. In contrast, courts should
241. See Peter Margulies, Asylum Update: Ninth Circuit Deals Two Defeats to the Trump
Administration, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/asylum-update-
ninth-circuit-deals-two-defeats-trump-administration. One panel of the Ninth Circuit initially reject-
ed a group of challengers' reading of the statute as not authorizing the MPP; a separate panel then
found otherwise. Id.
242. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs in one challenge were unlikely to prevail on a
claim that the MPP should have been subject o notice and comment rulemaking under the APA.
Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). The Court did
not address the questions of whether the MPP is "arbitrary and capricious" in violation of the APA
or represented a change from established agency practices without the agency having first gone
through a rational decision-making process. See id. at 509-10; see also Richard E. Levy & Robert L.
Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TX. L. REV. 499, 527-29 (2011) (discussing the stand-
ard of review for arbitrary and capricious agency action).
243. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2018).
244. For an example of a similar recently-filed claim, see Complaint for Declaratory and In-
junctive Relief at 48-50, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Kelly, No. CV17-5111 -JFW, 2017 WL 10592130
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2017) (alleging violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause as a result
of CBP's procedural use of "a variety of tactics to turn away asylum seekers at POEs along the U.S.-
Mexico border").
245. See Marouf, supra note 166, at 17-20; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1625, 1626 (1992) (describing the plenary power doctrine).
246. Marouf, supra note 166, at 19-20.
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view challenges to MPP merits hearings as they have other challenges to
removal hearings; in such cases courts have generally affirmed the due
process rights of noncitizens."'
The merits of the due process claim are compelling. The MPP de-
sign fails to offer adequate procedures in at least the following ways: (1)
by interfering with access to counsel at the screening and merits stage;
(2) by placing the burden on applicants to request a screening without
any notice concerning the nature of the MPP process; (3) by putting the
burden on applicants to show in MPP screenings that hey face harm in
Mexico by a preponderance of the evidence; (4) by failing to offer a
means to appeal negative screening decisions; and (5) by placing logisti-
cal barriers on applicants that prevent them from attending their merits
hearings and failing to provide notice to applicants sufficient to assure
their appearance at their hearings.24 8
As discussed above, the screenings fail to comply with the standards
advanced by the UNHCR, which states that the burden of proof should
be shared between asylum seekers and the state and that there should be
a right to counsel and appeal at all stages of the process.2 49 DHS initially
took the position that there could be no access to counsel in MPP screen-
ings.250 Although a federal court has enjoined the agency from denying
access to counsel at the screening stage, it is extraordinarily difficult, if
not impossible, for most MPP asylum applicants to obtain representa-
tion. 1 In fact, only 4,192 or less than 1% of MPP asylum seekers have
been represented at any point in the process, and the percentage of those
represented at the screening stage is undoubtedly miniscule.252 This com-
pares to an overall representation rate in 2019 for Immigration Court of
68%, showing that the program design systematically interferes with
legal representation.253 Moreover, the high percentage of in absentia or-
ders entered in MPP cases demonstrates that the program imposes un-
constitutional barriers on asylum seekers that prevent them from access-
ing the court process.254
247. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101-
02 (1903).
248. For a general discussion of these issues (without discussing procedural due process, spe-
cifically), see Human Rights First Brief, supra note 220.
249. UNHCR GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS, supra note 228, at 13.
250. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., PM602-0169, GUIDANCE FOR
IMPLEMENTING SECTION 235(B)(2)(C) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT AND THE
MIGRANT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS (2019).
251. Doe v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-2119-DMS, 2020 WL 209100, at *10-11 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14,
2020) (granting a preliminary injunction based on a finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed
on their claim that the APA guaranteed a right to counsel for MPP screenings).
252. TRAC IMMIGRATION, supra note 239.
253. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS: CURRENT
REPRESENTATION RATES (2020).
254. See TRAC IMMIGRATION, supra note 239 (showing that about 46% of cases so far have
resulted in in absentia orders).
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The test for procedural due process claims involves a balancing of
the potential harms and burdens on the government and the claimant.255
That analysis should come out on the side of the MPP applicants, who
face life-threatening risks in Mexico2 56 and who are only seeking a pro-
cess equivalent to that which the United States has been implementing
for decades through expedited removal.2 57 It is clear that the government
could, without prohibitively high costs, offer a right to counsel and ap-
peal, better admonitions concerning the MPP process, and a more equita-
ble standard of proof for MPP screenings because it has long been offer-
ing these procedures as part of the expedited removal process.258
Another challenge to the MPP might take the form of damages
claims by MPP transferees or their estate in cases in which they have
been killed or seriously injured upon their return to Mexico.259 Transfer-
ees might allege that government officials breached their duty to consider
available evidence that they would face harm upon return, although such
claims face a host of serious jurisprudential roadblocks.260 Ordinarily,
such a claim might fall under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), but
there is an exception that has been broadly applied to "any claim arising
in a foreign country.1261 There is an implied cause of action under the
case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents262 for constitutional viola-
tions, so claimants might try to bring complaints directly under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause against federal officials.263 However,
the extraterritorial reach of Bivens is doubtful under current caselaw.
264
Another avenue might lie under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which
creates federal court jurisdiction for torts that violate the "law of na-
tions."265 The principle of non-refoulement is a well-established principle
of customary international law, such that the failure of immigration offi-
255. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting out a balancing test for pro-
cedural due process claims that weighs the importance of the individual's and government's inter-
ests, together with "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such [private] interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards").
256. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 199, at 1.
257. See Human Rights First Brief, supra note 220.
258. See id.
259. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 199, at 2 (describing harms to MPP transferees in
Mexico).
260. See, e.g., Gwynne L. Skinner, Roadblocks to Remedies: Recently Developed Barriers to
Relief for Aliens Injured by U.S. Officials, Contrary to the Founders' Intent, 47 U. RICH. L. REV.
555,580-620 (2013).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2018). The Court has interpreted this exception to "bar[] all claims
based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission
occurred." Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
262. 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
263. See id.
264. See Hemandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 749 (2020) (holding that "multiple factors ...
counsel hesitationt" from extending Bivens to the context of a cross-border shooting).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The Court has held that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that does not
in and of itself create a cause of action, but that courts have authority to recognize "claim[s] under
the law of nations as an element of common law." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25.
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cials to apply it in MPP cases might give rise to ATS claims against
them.266 Claimants would need to argue, however, that they fall under an
exception to the Westfall Act, which requires that claims against federal
officials for negligent or wrongful acts committed within the scope of
their employment be generally brought under the FTCA.26
There are complex legal questions bearing on all of these interna-
tional and domestic claims, and this Section has only begun to address
them. The point of sketching out these claims in this part has been to
establish that litigation can be part of a broad strategy to resist the MPP
and other forms of refugee distancing.
CONCLUSION
In the 1980s, the international community largely accepted the
warehousing of refugees in terrible conditions in the least developed and
developed countries. A growing number of refugees reject this status quo
by traveling to more developed countries and claiming asylum. Asylum
has deep, normative roots and draws support from many constituencies,
even as the presence of a large number of asylum seekers in developed
countries generates a political backlash from nativist groups.
This tension created the phenomenon of refugee distancing-an ef-
fort to import the refugee camp model into the asylum systems of some
of the world's richest countries. Asylum seekers must make their claims
on the margins of the developed world-in violent borderlands like Ta-
maulipas or bleak island detention camps like Moria on Lesvos or Manus
in Papua New Guinea. Their physical isolation allows the adjudicators,
policy makers, and public of the countries the refugees seek to reach to
morally disengage from their claims.
Challenging this system requires crossing distance, whether by art,
media attention, or a transnational legal process that asserts humanitarian
norms in a variety of domestic and international fora. Earlier struggles
over refugee rights suggest the battle will lead to consequences policy
makers never intended and at least intermediate victories. Some forms of
distancing may prove permanent, while others might be limited.
266. See Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature ofNon-Refoulement, 13 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 533,
539 (2001).
267. The D.C. Circuit has held thar the Westfall Act creates immunity for federal officials
under the ATS and requires substitution of the United States as a party, bringing the claims under the
rubric of the FTCA instead of the ATS. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(construing 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988)). This logic would doom claims against the MPP, since the
FTCA does not offer redress for harms committed outside the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
However, the Ali decision was arguably wrongly decided, since the Westfall Act contains an excep-
tion for claims "brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under which such action
against an individual is otherwise authorized," and arguably the ATS is such a statute. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(b)(2)(B); Ali, 649 F.3d at 779 (Edwards, J., dissenting). Although the Ali majority held that
the ATS is only a jurisdictional statute and thus does not fall under the exception, Judge Edwards
pointed out in his dissent that the ATS "authoriz[es] the federal courts to impose liability." Ali, 649
F.3d at 792 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
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More than four decades old, interdiction has proven durable, despite
a scholarly consensus that it violates the Refugee Convention.26 8 Alt-
hough President Clinton criticized the Bush Administration's policy of
interdiction and return of Haitian asylum seekers when running for of-
fice, he decided to continue interdiction policies when elected.2 69 On the
other hand, resistance and lobbying led to benefits that remedied some of
the other draconian asylum policies of the 1980s and early 1990s.
27
0
Moreover, the challenges in the 1990s to Haitian interdiction established
precedent concerning procedural rights that had far-reaching conse-
quences.2 1
It is very possible to imagine future presidents looking at a program
like the MPP and making the same political calculation that President
Clinton did when he left in place Haitian interdiction. On the other hand,
the more glaring procedural defects of the MPP might be as vulnerable to
challenge as the egregious aspects of the Haitian asylum screening dur-
ing the 1990s. Yet Haitian interdiction teaches that procedural challenges
do not always lead to substantive victories. In one vision of the future,
the MPP evolves in response to litigation challenges to become more
procedurally fair, while remaining in place in some form. On the other
hand, conditions along the Mexican border are so disastrous from a hu-
manitarian perspective that it is also possible to imagine resistance lead-
ing to the abandonment of the program entirely.
The battles over refugee distancing distract from one of the most
significant human rights failures of the modern era: millions of displaced
refugees remain in refugee camps or other poor conditions in the devel-
oping or least developed world.2 This means that the struggle over pro-
grams like the MPP can only ever amount to tinkering around the edges
of a humanitarian catastrophe. Yet the lawsuits, photographs, news sto-
ries, and paintings are a way, if nothing else, to counter the moral disen-
gagement of a comfortable developed world. Asylum will not solve the
world's refugee problem, but it can cross the distance of human suffering
in individual cases.
268. See Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 9, at 247-48.
269. Ratner, supra note 81, at 200-02.
270. See discussion supra Section H.A.
271. See Hongju Koh & Wishnie, supra note 97, at 423-24.
272. See UNHCR GLOBAL TRENDS, supra note 1, at 18.
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